Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts

Thursday, August 14, 2014

China to Raise Some Natural Gas Prices

China's National Development and Reform Commission announced a more than 20 percent increase in natural gas prices for commercial and industrial users as of Sept. 1, along with removing price controls on imported liquefied natural gas, shale gas and coal bed methane.  The NDRC has a difficult balance to strike between allowing prices to rise sufficiently to encourage expanded domestic gas production and gas import projects, while keeping prices low enough to expand demand to meet environmental goals.  Full story on China's gas prices changes and strategy here.

Tuesday, August 12, 2014

China Slashes Shale Gas Target

Reuters, citing a Chinese website, reports that China has dropped its target of 60-80 billion cubic metres of shale gas production in 2020 to only 30 bcm.  A likely boost for China's LNG import requirements.  Full story here.

Tuesday, February 11, 2014

Big Gas Find in China

      As an update to my Nov. 5, 2013, article "China Steps on the Gas," in The Abraham Energy Report, note that UPI yesterday ran a story of a major natural gas find in China's Sichuan Basin.  China National Petroleum Corp. claimed that China's Land and Resources Ministry had verified technically recoverable reserves of one trillion cubic feet of gas at CNPC's Anyue gas field.  First phase production of the field is targeted to reach 140 billion cubic feet (3.96 billion cubic metres) per year.  The full UPI article is available here.

Friday, August 2, 2013

China Shale Gas Resources Redux

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Re the June 25, 2012, article below, “Shale Gas Resources Drop, China Next?”, the U.S. Energy Information Administration has lowered its estimate of China’s shale gas resources by 12.5 percent.  The EIA June 2013 Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources, a revision of its April 2011 study, lowered China’s shale gas TRR to 1,115 trillion cubic feet (TCF~31.6 trillion cubic metres) from 1275 Tcf in 2011.  The EIA analysis, performed by Advanced Resources International, Inc., summed new estimates for the Sichuan (626 Tcf), Tarim (216 Tcf), Junggar (36 Tcf) and Songliao (16 Tcf) basins with 222 Tcf from smaller, more structurally complex Yangtze Platform, Jianghan and Subei basins. 

EIA based its revision on “…better information regarding the total organic content and geologic complexity … of the shale gas resource in the Qiongzhusi formation in the Sichuan Basin and Lower Cambrian shales in the Tarim Basin. The Qiongzhusi Shale gas resource estimate was reduced from 349 trillion cubic feet in the 2011 report to 125 trillion cubic feet in this report. The lower estimate resulted from the prospective area being reduced from 56,875 square miles to 6,500 square miles. Similarly, the prospective area of the Lower Cambrian shales was reduced from 53,560 square miles in 2011 to 6,520 square miles in the current report, resulting in a reduction in the shale gas estimate from 359 trillion cubic feet in 2011 to 44 trillion cubic feet now.”

While noting the country-wide shale gas development problems in China of complex geology, limited technological and equipment services, water resource constraints and lack of infrastructure, the EIA observed that the Sichuan basin—which holds more than half of China’s shale gas TRR—has existing pipelines, abundant surface water supplies and close proximity to major municipal markets.  In June, China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) commenced construction of the country’s first dedicated shale gas pipeline.  The 92.8 kilometre (57.7 miles) conduit will link Changning block gas wells to an existing gas pipeline that connects with neighboring Yunnan Province.  The new pipe’s designed capacity is 4.5 mmcm (159 mmcf) per day.

EIA’s estimate of China’s technically recoverable shale gas resources still exceeds those of China’s Ministry of Land Resources, noted in the article below.  Further, the EIA/ARI report emphasizes that future exploration and development drilling in China will affect shale gas TRR estimates, and could increase these appraisals.  So while China’s early targets for shale gas production of 6.5 bcm in 2015 and 60-100 bcm in 2020 appear unrealistic, China continues to possess by far the world’s largest shale gas resources.  This resource endowment, combined with recent increases in producer prices for natural gas (see July 16 article below) and a government commitment to reduce the growth of emissions from energy consumption, holds hope for the long-term future of shale gas development in China.

Tuesday, July 16, 2013

China, India Raise Gas Prices...Who Wins, Who Loses? Part 1

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In June, the Governments of both China and India raised administered prices of natural gas to enhance domestic production of the environmentally desirable fuel and to decrease losses to state gas producers.  In India’s case, the changes do not take effect until the next fiscal year, beginning April 2014.

For both countries, the price increases are limited to certain sectors and their beneficial effects will be constrained by the web of governmental controls over the energy market.

This article examines the impact in China; a subsequent article will look at Delhi’s decisions.

China still relies on “King Coal” for two-thirds of its primary energy supplies and more than four-fifths of its electric power inputs (IEA:2009).  Recognizing the damage that coal-related pollution causes, the Government since 2000 has set goals to grow natural gas’s share in total primary energy use from two percent, to less than five percent at present, to eight percent in 2015 and 10 percent in 2020. 

Despite success in boosting domestic natural gas production from some 32 billion cubic metres (bcm) in 2002 to more than 107 bcm in 2012 (BP:2013), China turned to imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) starting in 2006 from Australia and pipeline gas in 2009 from Turkmenistan (via Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) to meet demand.  The Turkmen pipeline reached full capacity of 40 bcm annually last year ßand the contract was increased to an eventual 65 bcm/y.  A 2006 agreement to import 60-80 bcm/y of pipeline gas from Russia has foundered on failure to agree on pricing.  China has added Indonesia, Malaysia and Qatar as long-term LNG suppliers to its five receiving terminals, and has additional terminals planned and under construction.

China also boasts the world’s largest shale gas resources, but already has abandoned its target of 6.5 bcm of shale gas production in 2015 in the face of difficult geology, a lack of pipeline capacity, a steeper learning curve on the technology of shale gas exploration and development, and serious water constraints (hydraulic fracturing, which made the shale gas revolution in the U.S. possible, uses vast quantities of water).

The problem is pricing.  China paid $8.79 per million British thermal units (MMBtu) for pipeline gas imports from Central Asia in May 2013; $18.77 for Qatar LNG; $7.98 for Malay LNG; $3.87 for Indonesia; and $3.54 for Australia (Reuters).  In May 2013, China National Offshore Oil Corp. Ltd. (CNOOC), which holds a 13.9 percent stake in Indonesia’s Tangguh LNG plant, agreed to renegotiate the price it pays for LNG destined for CNOOC’s Fujian terminal.  It already agreed in 2006 to increase the price from $2.40 to $3.40 per MMBtu.  New Australian LNG projects will price their product based on oil vs. the promotional price provided for Northwest Shelf LNG to crack the China market back in 2006.

Arrayed against these rates, China’s price push seems puny.  The National Development and Reform Commission’s (NDRC) new natural gas wholesale price, which took effect July 10, represents a15 percent rise to a national average of 1.95 yuan per cubic metre (approximately $9.00/MMBtu).  The higher price does not apply to residential users who make up nearly 30% of China’s gas market and the NDRC announced at the same time it may increase subsidies for farmers, limit the price increase for natural gas feedstocks to fertilizer producers, and urge local governments to give temporary subsidies to drivers of natural gas-fueled taxis.  This means that the increase will fall on industrial and commercial clients, who make up half of China’s natural gas market.  Gas fires less than two percent of China’s power plants.

China’s gas producers certainly will welcome the new prices.  China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC), the nation’s main gas producer and importer, reportedly booked losses of nearly $7 billion in 2012 by selling natural gas below acquisition cost. 

The NDRC faces a difficult quandary:  it wants to increase gas use, primarily to achieve environmental goals.  Higher prices will prod more domestic production, but higher prices also will stifle demand, especially in the face of continued low prices for coal.  Other than a pilot project in some southern provinces, which started in 2011, administered natural gas prices have not risen in China since 2010. 

The ideal solution would be for the government to move quickly to market pricing for all fuels for all sectors, but there is too much fear that such moves might stoke social unrest.  That explains the shielding of the residential sector, despite its large size and relatively inelastic demand (residential users cannot rapidly or easily switch heating fuels). 

Since a purely market solution is unlikely, again the NDRC will have to turn to economic solutions with Chinese characteristics.  The elements needed to boost natural gas use include:


  1. Smaller, but more frequent (annual), natural gas price increases.
  2. Application of gas prices increases to all users.
  3. Allowance of full pass-through of gas price increases by intermediate users, e.g. electric utilities.
  4. Regulatory or fiscal restraints on coal use and promotion of gas use, such as the requirement in Beijing prior to the 2008 Olympics that new apartment and office buildings be piped for eventual gas use.
  5. Removal of the value-added tax on coal-bed methane and shale gas exploration and development.
  6. More stringent, and more effectively enforced, emissions regulations on coal-fired power plants.
  7.  Introduction of a carbon tax, which would impact coal more heavily than gas, although both emit carbon dioxide.


 The NDRC realizes that natural gas must capture a significantly larger share of China’s energy consumption to meet both environmental and energy security goals.  In the transition to more market-based pricing throughout the energy sector, the NDRC must use all of the economic and regulatory levers at its command to move the market toward a more sustainable energy future.

Thursday, January 24, 2013

2013 Oil Market Outlook

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From Jan. 2012 oil outlook: “…Barring a major issue with Iran, which could send prices to $150 and above, prices should ratchet up slightly to track between $85 and $120 per barrel (WTI), averaging $105-110.”  Clearly too bearish--average actual WTI 2012 was about $94, with a weekly average range of $80 to $108.
 
  
For 2013, What the ‘pros” say:
USDOE.  EIA STEO Jan. 2013:  Brent and WTI crude oil spot prices to average $105 and $89.5 per barrel, respectively, in 2013. The projected WTI discount to Brent crude oil, which averaged $23 per barrel in November 2012, falls to an average of $11 per barrel by the fourth quarter of 2013.
Reuters’ annual survey of 26 analysts showed an average forecast of $108 for Brent in 2013, down from $112 in 2012, and WTI at $94.  Four put 2013 Brent above $115 in 2013, including Goldman Sachs, who calls for Brent at $130 and WTI $126, as capacity on the Seaway pipeline hits 400,000 b/d.
Upside Factors
Middle East
Iran.  Nuclear program--US, Europe sanctions; Iranian interference with Straits of Hormuz; this year Iran’s program could reach the point of triggering Israeli a/o U.S. military response.
Iraq, Syria and Egypt all placing strains on relations among ME countries and between them and the U.S.  Pipeline sabotage plagues Yemeni production and Syrian production unlikely to stabilize soon.

Global demand. The IEA sees continued sluggish demand in 2013, rising .865 mmb/d to 90.5.  Demand up .85 mmb/d in 2012 (vice 1.3 projected).
   Turnaround in economic growth rate could boost oil demand in China, the world’s 2d largest consumer.  India, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Brazil follow Japan in oil consumption and will see 2013 oil demand grow 2.5 to 4.5%, the IEA forecasts, as Japan’s demand slumps more than 3%. 
     The U.S. remains by far the world’s largest oil user at >18 mmb/d. 2013 oil demand growth >0.5%, mostly on freight shipments and industrial use.
Dollar. A declining U.S. dollar in 2013 will tend to push up oil prices. 
   Both U.S. economic growth and the dollar’s value are tied to resolution of long-term U.S. debt issues, but with opposite effects.

Downside Factors

Europe.  Demand in 2012 contracted sharply, -6.0% in 3Q12.   In 2013, European oil demand will decline less rapidly, weighted to the first half. The IEA also foresees North Sea oil output declining some 0.18 mmb/d.

MENA.  Increasing production by Libya and Iraq would depress prices, but Saudi will offset.  In Africa, a border security zone agreement between Sudan and South Sudan continues to stall export resumption.    Iran returns…?  Iran could be an outlier on the downside:  if the June presidential elections in Iran bring it back to the negotiating table with the EU and US, both could reduce sanctions, thus putting up to 1mmb/d of Iranian oil back on the global market.
North America.  The IEA expects a robust jump of 0.35 mmb/d in Canadian oil production, based on increased output from oil and tar sands.  Higher production in the U.S., mostly from tight oil and shale oil formations, will add 0.5-0.9 mmb/d, dropping U.S. liquid fuel imports to less than 40% of consumption for the first time in more than two decades.  Put simply, the US and Canada are likely to increase oil production in 2013 more than the total rise in global oil demand.
My Call
Once again, the outlier is Middle East politics.  Based on market fundamentals, oil prices should be less volatile in 2013.  WTI should trade in a narrower range of $80 to $100 per barrel, rising throughout the year, with an average a bit above $90.  Brent ends year at about $115.
©  Robert S. Price Jr., International Risk Strategies, Tampa, FL Jan. 2013 (Originally presented to the Longboat Key Economic Roundtable.)

Monday, June 25, 2012

Shale Gas Resources Drop, China Next?


            The U.S. Government today nearly halved its estimate of U.S. shale gas resources.  This follows an even more drastic decline in Poland’s shale gas resources by its national geological institute.  As China starts serious drilling of its shale gas resources, will its optimistic resource assessment also drop?
            In April 2011, the Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy released World Shale Gas Resources:  An Initial Assessment of 14 Regions Outside of the United States. That ground-breaking study suggested that global shale gas technically recoverable resources (TRR) of 6622 trillion cubic feet (tcf) roughly equaled global proved natural gas reserves.  TRR clearly is a more speculative measure than proved reserves, which define known gas that can be economically produced with current technology.  Still, the TRR figure firmly established global shale gas as a worldwide energy sector game changer.
            World Shale Gas Resources crowned China as king with 1275 tcf of TRR, followed by the U.S. with 862 tcf, Argentina with 774 tcf, and Mexico at 681.  The study found the largest shale gas resources in Europe in Poland (187 tcf) and France (180 tcf).
             In its 2012 Annual Energy Outlook, released today (June 25), the EIA lowered its estimate of U.S. shale gas TRR to 482 tcf—a 44 percent decline.  The fall resulted largely from a 67 percent drop in EIA’s estimate of TRR in the 100,000 square mile Marcellus shale that spreads across eight states from Tennessee to New York, but with most drilling in Pennsylvania and West Virginia.  (New York imposed a moratorium on shale gas exploitation, pending an environmental assessment.)  EIA followed a revision by the U.S. Geological Survey of the Marcellus shale.  EIA emphasized that further drilling could result in a future upward revision of resources and that the lower TRR does not directly correlate to projected production.
            The Polish Geological Institute announced its Assessment of shale gas and shale oil resources in Poland—First report on March 21.  The PGI emphasized that the report should be considered only a conservative, initial estimate as it was based on 39 wells drilled between 1950 and 1990.  Still, Minister Piotr Woźniak, Poland’s Chief Geologist, noted that only 22 wells had been completed since 2010 and a mere 14 were planned for 2012, compared to the thousands drilled annually in the U.S.  The PGI estimated the most probable level of Polish shale gas resources between 346.1 billion cubic metres (12.2 tcf) and 767.9 bcm (27.1 tcf).  Even the high end of the range is 85.5 percent lower than EIA’s estimate in World Shale Gas Resources a year earlier.  Last week the Gazeta Wyborcza reported that ExxonMobil would abandon its shale gas exploration projects in Poland after test wells failed to produce commercial results.
            So back to China.  Already in March 2012, China’s Ministry of Land and Resources scaled back its estimate of the country’s shale gas TRR from 31 tcm (1095 tcf) to 25.1 tcm (886 tcf) based on its most extensive appraisal to date.  The MLR noted that the complicated geology of its shale gas reserves and the relative inexperience of its companies would make shale gas production difficult.  Others have cited China’s regulatory regime, including administrative (versus market) pricing of gas, the lack of pipeline infrastructure, and the fact that some of China’s large shale gas resources, such as those in Xinjiang, are in semi-arid areas, as potential impediments.  Nonetheless, the government of China has moved forward on leasing shale gas tracts.  China’s big three—China National Petroleum Corp./PetroChina, China National Offshore Oil Corp. and Sinopec—all have purchased North American shale gas assets to learn the technology and have brought in Shell, Chevron, BP and others to work Chinese basins.
            China’s current Five Year Plan calls for production of 6.5 bcm (230 bcf) by 2015 from 19 major shale gas regions across the country.  By 2020, China’s National Development and Planning Commission expects shale gas production to jump to between 60 and 100 bcm (2 to 3.5 trillion cubic feet). 
            Whether or not China meets its ambitious shale gas production plans, the U.S. and Polish cases suggest that further drilling in China may well mean further reductions in the estimates of China’s overall shale gas resource.

Thursday, September 15, 2011

Shale Gas Opportunities for US Independents in China?

Toshi Yoshida, corporate and energy partner at the law firm of Mayer Brown LLP, recently told E&P Online that China's shale gas development holds significant opportunity for U.S. independents who have extensive experience in developing America's shale gas resources. Read here.
I would caution that there are significant risks in such ventures: First, energy is a "strategic sector" in China so that foreign participation is curtailed. Note that so far no foreign companies have been allowed to bid on shale gas lease auctions in China, even as minority partners to Chinese firms. There have been suggestions that this might change, but still with foreign companies as minority partners. Second, Chinese hypersensitivity in this sector was amply demonstrated by the imprisonment of U.S. geologist Xue Feng for espionage for acquiring Chinese geophysical data that anywhere else would be considered purely commercial. Third, China's new regulations have increased pressure on foreign firms to provide Chinese partners with proprietary technology as a requirement of market entry; and China's long-standing failure to protect intellectual property is well documented. Finally, as the recent Yahoo-Alibaba/Alipay case demonstrated, dealings with a Chinese partner may be less than transparent and foreign partners cannot expect protection under the Chinese legal system. So I would strongly suggest that U.S. independents carefully weigh the considerable risks against any possible rewards before investing their capital (financial or intellectual) in China. [Disclosure: I own stock in Chesapeake Energy and Devon Energy.]

Friday, March 18, 2011

PetroChina Pushes Shale Gas

Further to my post below, Bloomberg is reporting that PetroChina President Zhou Jiping yesterday pledged to accelerate his company's oil and gas development, noting that "The nuclear plant closure in Japan will boost its demand for oil and gas. That will have a pretty big impact as Japan is the world's largest liquefied natural gas importer." Read full article here.

Tuesday, March 15, 2011

Japan Disaster to Spur Asian Shale Gas

The Financial Times Monday noted that as Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) lost 9,700 megawatts of nuclear power from Friday’s earthquake and tsunami—nearly 20 percent of Japan’s total electricity generating capacity—British LNG (liquefied natural gas) import prices spiked 12 percent. Even if Japanese authorities do not shut down other nuclear facilities, the loss of these facilities means Japanese electric utilities will have to find additional oil, coal and LNG to generate power. Perhaps for an extended period.
An earthquake at TEPCO’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear plant in July 2007 forced a nearly two-year-long shutdown, sending TEPCO scrambling to increase its purchases of crude, fuel oil and LNG. While the 2008 recession lowered TEPCO customer power demand in 2009, the 2008 spike in world oil prices greatly boosted the price of crude, fuel oil and LNG, which in Japan’s contracts is linked to oil. The additional annual cost for these fuel purchases was estimated at the time at more than 70 billion yen (US$ 900 million).
China and India have just begun major LNG import programs. Since 2006, China has constructed four LNG receiving terminals, pushing LNG imports to nearly 10 percent of total Chinese gas supplies. Chinese companies are building another four terminals, and several more are under consideration, as are expansions of existing terminals at Shenzen, Fujian and Shanghai. Shell and Petronet operate LNG receiving terminals in India’s Gujarat State. Additional terminals at Dahbol and Kochi are expected on stream in 2011 and 2012, with plants and Ennore, Mudra, Mangalore and Dighi Port possible.
Both China and India also have stepped up their pursuit of domestic shale gas. State-owned China National Offshore Oil Corp. and PetroChina have made mutli-billion dollar buys of shale gas properties in Canada and the U.S. India’s privately owned Reliance Industries has purchased substantial shale gas assets in the Marcellus and Eagle Ford shale gas basins in the U.S. Additionally, both China and India have begun to explore their domestic shale gas resources and plan to auction domestic shale gas leases this year.
China and India both control the price of domestic natural gas—well below the current LNG import price. A step increase in LNG import prices, caused by TEPCO’s sudden and sustained need for alternative generation fuels, will force both China and India to reconsider LNG's role in their energy mix and propel both to accelerate their domestic shale gas programs.

Sunday, August 22, 2010

Sanctions and Iran's LNG Export Plans

For a decade, in the face of increasing international sanctions to force Iran to halt nuclear developments than could be used for military purposes and to stop its support of international terrorism, Iranian government and company officials defiantly have announced nearly a dozen gas exports projects. These included both pipeline projects and liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants.
Following the June 9, 2010, imposition by the United Nations Security Council of its fourth round of sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program, both the United States and the European Union adopted sanctions that, in part, specifically target Iran’s oil and gas industry, including LNG technology.
Suddenly this month, Iran announced the suspension of development of several LNG plants. On August 7, National Iranian Oil Company Managing Director Ahmed Ghalebani announced that Iran was suspending some LNG projects, including Persian LNG. Three days later, Deputy Oil Minister Mohsen Khojastemehr stated that Iran would ice the Pars LNG project and “inject the gas from South Pars blocks 11, 13 and 14 into oil fields and in the national gas network. Khojastemehr said that “some countries had used a policy of lengthy negotiations and wasting time to impede the production of the South Pars projects.”
This blog will examine the potential effect of sanctions on Iran’s plans to export LNG; a subsequent blog will deal with Iran’s plans to expand its exports of natural gas via pipelines.
Iran’s Natural Gas Exports
Iran holds nearly 30 trillion cubic metres (1046 trillion cubic feet) or nearly 16 percent of global proved natural gas reserves, second only to Russia’s 44.4 tcm (1567 tcf). But failure to fully develop this resource left Iran with only 4.4 percent of 2009 natural gas production (131 bcm, compared with America’s 593, Russia’s 528 or Canada’s 161). Despite its huge proved reserves, Iran’s role in the international trade of gas is miniscule: it exports small amounts to Turkey and Armenia and imports gas from Turkmenistan, all via relatively small cross-border pipelines.
This failure to develop its extensive gas reserves particularly galls Iran because its huge South Pars gas field is the extension of Qatar’s undersea North Dome Field. The combined South Pars/North Dome gas condensate field is the world’s largest gas field, with an estimated 50 tcm of natural gas and some 50 billion barrels of condensates. North Dome Field was discovered in 1971 and Qatar began production in 1991. The field has fueled Qatar’s petrochemical and LNG plants at Ras Laffan and propelled Qatar to the position of the world’s largest LNG exports, ahead of Indonesia, in 2006. Last year Qatar exported nearly 50 bcm of LNG (and more than 17 bcm of pipeline gas). In 2011, when new trains at both RasGas and Qatargas come online, Qatar’s LNG export capacity will reach 77 million metric tones (about 104 bcm) annually. Further frustration for Iran comes from having missed a golden opportunity after Qatar in 2005 declared a moratorium on further North Dome Field development pending a full re-assessment of resources and potential markets; the moratorium is expected to end in three to four years.
This article will focus on Iran’s attempts to develop its natural gas resources for export as liquefied natural gas (LNG). A subsequent article will examine Iran’s plans for exports of natural gas via pipelines.

Foreign Assistance for LNG

The LNG business has been dominated by the major international oil companies because of their technical, and project management expertise, global marketing outreach, and not least, their ability to finance hugely capital intensive, expensive LNG projects, which included not only gas exploration, development, production, gathering and treatment, but also liquefaction, transport via specialized ships, and regasification facilities at the import end. A key part of the value chain is the process of liquefying natural gas at a temperature of about minus 260 degrees Fahrenheit (-162° Celsius). Four firms provide the technology used in most gas liquefaction plants worldwide: America’s Air Products and Conoco (the Phillips Cascade Technology acquired in the Conoco-Phillips merger), Anglo-Dutch Shell, and France’s Air Liquide.
Iran began bringing in foreign companies to help shape its LNG strategy a decade ago, with a tender for assistance on developing Iran LNG, the first Iranian LNG project. Also in 2001 Iran’s then Petroleum Minister Bijan Zanganeh created the National Iranian Gas Export Co. (NIGEC), with a focus on developing the countries LNG projects. At the time, it was believed that the domestically focused National Iranian Gas Co (NIGC) was too bureaucratic and ineffectual to lead the ambitious gas export portfolio. In this decade, officials from Iran’s government and various oil and gas entities have announced a deluge of deals for upstream gas development, LNG facility design and construction, and LNG exports.
Iran LNG. Based on gas from South Pars field, phase 12, Iran LNG was the first project developed. The National Iranian Oil Co. (NIOC) took 49% of the roughly US$ 4.5 billion project, with two Iranian oil industry pension funds taking 51%. The liquefaction and loading facilities are located at Tombak, on Iran’s west coast. With the three major purveyors of liquefaction technology in the U.S. and France blocked by sanctions, Iran reportedly turned to Statoil-Linde (Norway-Germany) to supply the liquefaction technology for the 10.8 million metric tons (MMT) annual capacity Iran LNG project. Linde supplied this technology for Statoil’s Snovit LNG plant in Norway and which experienced several years of startup problems. Other foreign companies involved in Iran LNG design and construction reportedly were South Korea’s Hyundai and Daelim, Italy’s Snamprogetti and APS Engineering, Germany’s Steiner-Prematechnik-Gastec, and China’s HuaFu Engineering Co. Iranian companies were involved in design and construction of both the plant and the jetty, offsite and utility plants. At least some of the foreign partners signed contracts with Iran’s Khatam-ol-Anbia Construction Headquarters, an engineering arm of Iran’s Islamic Republic Guards Corps. In April 2007, NIGEC signed an agreement with Austria’s OMV to ship 2.2 million metric tons (MMT) of LNG annually (term unknown) from Iran LNG to a terminal under construction in Croatia.
In August 2009, with insufficient internal funds for the $4.25 billion liquefaction facility, Iran planned to open 80% of the project to foreign investors to raise the $4 billion needed. When foreign offers were not forthcoming, in November 2009, Iran LNG tried to pressure two Indian firms to pay an advance of at least one billion U.S. dollars against the future supply of LNG to India. Talks between Iran and India on LNG supplies already had collapsed when Iran in July 2007 insisted that the contracted price of $3.215 be raised to $4.78. Earlier this year, the Mehr News Agency quoted Iran LNG Co. Managing Director Ali Kheyrandish as saying that costs for the project had risen to $5.5 billion, but that the project was 30% complete. First shipments from Iran LNG now are expected in the first quarter of 2012.
Pars LNG. In February 2004, NIOC engaged France’s Total and Malaysia’s Petronas to develop South Pars Field, phase 11, for the Pars LNG project. NIOC would hold 50%, Total 40% and Petronas 10%. Two years later, Pars LNG Co. entered into a preliminary agreement to export 3 MMT of LNG annually from Pars LNG to Thailand’s PTT Exploration & Production Co. starting in 2011. In January, 2008, the Fars News Agency reported that NIGEC Director of Investments and Participation Mohammad Javad Ahmadi Abhari suggested that half of Total’s shares be given to potential LNG buyers and gave Total until June to finalize the Pars LNG deal. Total appeared to drop plans in July 2008, a day after state media reported that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards had test-fired an updated version of the Shahab-3 missile, with a range of 2000 kilometres (1200 miles). Still, the project limped along until Iran, impatient with Total for not committing to development, handed Total’s share over to state-owned China National Petroleum Corp. earlier this year. Iran’s Deputy Oil Minister announced on August 10 that Iran would suspend the project and use the gas resources domestically.
Persian LNG. At about the same time it launched Pars LNG, NIOC brought in Shell and Spain’s Repsol for development of South Pars Field phases 13 and 14, to fuel Persian LNG. The $13 billion project would start with one 8.1 MMT train and add one more train in a second phase for a total export capacity of some 16.2 MMT annually. Earlier this year, Shell and Repsol dropped out of the project ahead of the June U.N. Security Council Sanctions. On August 7, NIOC Managing Director Ahmed Ghalebani announced that Iran was suspending Persian LNG.
North Pars LNG. In 2006, China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) was proffered a role in the development of the North Pars field for an LNG project of some 20 MMT annual capacity. For its efforts, CNOOC also secures 25 years of LNG supply.
Golshan LNG. In December 2007, NICO offered Malaysia’s SKS Group half interest with NIOC in the $16 billion development of the Golshan and Ferdows fields in Bushehr Province for a 10 MMT LNG export project. ($5-6 billion for upstream development and $10-11 billion for the LNG plant and jetties.)
Others. There were two other LNG projects discussed. In August 2007, NIOC and the South Pars Oil & Gas Co. discussed development of South Pars Field, phases 19, 20 and 21 with Italy’s state oil and gas company Eni. Earlier that year, Germany’s gas giant Eon reported that it was in talks with Iran to buy LNG and one of Eon senior executives stated that Iranian LNG was necessary for European gas supply security. Finally, in February 2008, Poland’s PGNiG signed a letter of intent in Tehran with the Iranian Offshore Oil Co. to develop Iran’s Lavan gas field, with the possibility of LNG supplies.

Factors Impeding Iran’s LNG Development
As recently as December 2007, Iran LNG Company Managing Director Ali Kheir-Andish was quoted in the Tehran Times as telling a Tehran International Oil and Gas Conference that Iran would produce 22 MMT of LNG in 2015, 44 MMT in 2018 and about 88 MMT in 2022, with first deliveries in 2010. Now it appears Iran will find it a challenge to hit 11 MMT of LNG exports by 2015 and beyond that is pure speculation.
Clearly sanctions imposed by the United Nations’ Security Council, but more importantly, additional U.S. and European Union sanctions targeting Iran’s oil and gas industries, have impeded Iran’s LNG development. As stated above, LNG projects require a level of technology; project management financing; and upstream, shipping and marketing integration that have won major roles for the international oil companies in the global LNG business. But sanctions alone cannot account for the decade-long disaster of Iranian LNG development. Other factors hampering Iran’s plans to export LNG, beyond sanctions, include:
• Iran’s terms for foreign partners. Due to its constitution, Iran offers only buy-back contracts for oil and gas exploration and development, while international oil companies prefer production-sharing agreements. Buy-backs do not allow IOCs to book reserves discovered; Iran’s in particular have had short time frames, as little as four years, to recover costs; and Iran’s buy-backs have offered rates of return less than some international investors sought.
• use of gas to cover domestic demand. Demand for domestic natural gas—as for oil products—is artificially increased by massive subsidies. The internal Iranian price for natural gas is less than 40 cents per million British thermal units, compared with current spot LNG prices of some $12/MMBtu in Asia and $8/MMBut in Europe.
• internal opposition by some elements to gas exports. The internal conflicts about foreign access to Iranian oil and gas resources can lead to protracted and difficult negotiations with potential foreign partners.
• growing amounts of gas used to boost Iranian oil production. According to an October 2009 report by the Financial Times, to maintain pressure in its oil fields, Iran reinjects as much gas as Qatar exports.
• planning and construction on LNG export projects worldwide slowed in 2006-7 due to rapidly rising costs associated with supply constraints on materials, equipment, and design, engineering and construction crews.
• The 2008-9 global financial crisis and following recession dropped gas imports in major LNG importers—Asia, Europe and the U.S. In addition, the huge and rapid jump in shale gas production in the U.S. during 2008-2010 stifled LNG import demand in the U.S. to the extent that several U.S. terminals sought permission to re-export LNG. This glut further softened prices.

Iran’s LNG Future

Clearly international sanctions stymied Iran’s LNG program. In announcing the suspension of Pars LNG, Deputy Oil Minister Khohastemehr noted that pipeline “gas exports are cheaper and can be done faster, while exports of LNG not only require huge investments and complicated technology but are also time consuming.” Without the sanctions, Iran’s LNG projects would not have been as time consuming and foreign partners such as Total, Shell, Petronas and others with LNG experience could have supplied the investments and technology. Absent the sanctions, it is very possible that by now Iran LNG would be up and running and that Persian LNG or Pars LNG or possibly both would be moving toward completion.
Germany, France, Spain, Italy and other European countries would have liked to access Iranian LNG to reduce their overdependence on gas from Russia. China, India and other Asian countries see Iranian LNG as a way to reduce their dependence on imported oil and/or lower the rate of growth of coal combustion and its attendant local, national and global pollution problems.
Some countries support Iran’s efforts despite the sanctions. In May 2010, Iranian state tanker company executive director Mohammad Suri announced that Iran had placed an order with China for Iran’s first LNG tanker. Suri estimated that Iran would have to spend some $1.2 billion for the five ships needed for Iran LNG. Delivery of the first ship from China is expected in four years. Suri noted that China would pay 90% of the financing for construction of the tanker and that Chinese companies charge 10% less than South Korean companies. Although France and Norway have considerable experience building LNG tankers, South Korean and Japanese firms dominate the LNG tanker market. South Korean and Japanese companies have, respectively, some three and four decades experience. Hudong Zhonghua Shipyard built China’s first LNG tanker five years ago. An LNG ship building contract with Iran would have boosted China’s global role, but NIOC has since failed to approve the preliminary agreement with China for an LNG carrier and the deal is cancelled. As mentioned above, China Offshore Oil and Gas Co. and China National Petroleum Corp. remain active in Iranian oil and gas development.
It may be fortunate to have the gas originally planned for Persian LNG and Pars LNG available for oil field reinjection. Over the past four years, oil and gas prices have diverged considerably. Current LNG prices are less than $5/MMBtu in the U.S., about $8/MMBtu in Europe and some $12/MMBtu in Asia. And note that these are landed prices, i.e. liquefaction and shipping costs are included. Compare this with the roughly $80 per barrel or $13/MMBtu prices that oil commands and evidently Iran gains by reinjecting its gas—which it can produce later—to sell higher priced crude. This may be something of a false dichotomy, however, considering that with the huge size of Iran’s proven gas reserves, it could both reinject gas for enhanced oil production, export LNG and export gas via pipelines.
All this means that Iran LNG should be able to find long-term markets—probably in Asia—for its 11 MMT output by the time it comes onstream in 2012 or possibly later. But Iran is unlikely in this decade to reach the ranks of major LNG exporters.
The next blog will look at Iran’s planned natural gas pipeline export programs.

Monday, June 21, 2010

Iranian Sanctions

Today, Monday, June 21, 2010, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-CT) and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman (D-CA), conference chairs for the bill to strengthen Iran sanctions, announced that they had agreed on a draft joint text to reconcile the House and Senate bills imposing additional sanctions on Iran for its illicit nuclear program and support of terrorism. A press release from the House Committee stated that H.R. 2194, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 would impose an array of tough new economic penalties aimed at persuading Iran to change its conduct, including targeting business entities involved in petroleum product sales to Iran.

The United Nations Security Council imposed its fourth round of sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program on June 9. While U.S. President Obama praised the UN resolution as “the toughest sanctions ever faced by the Iranian government,” the U.S. and its allies had taken months to negotiate sanctions that many felt were watered down to avoid vetoes by Russia or China, permanent members of the Security Council. China insisted that economic targets such as banks and energy companies not be singled out, but the U.S. succeeded in obtaining oblique language in the sanctions’ preamble noting “potential connection between Iran’s revenues derived from its energy sector” and possible financing for its nuclear program.

As other nations have increased sanctions on Iran, China and its companies have moved in to fill the void. According to a Financial Times analysis, China has overtaken the European Union to become Iran’s largest trading partner. Iran imports consumer goods and machinery from China, while China imports oil and petrochemicals and plans to import liquefied natural gas. A senior Iranian official reported has complained publicly about the quality of Chinese-made equipment.

The U.S. and Europe conceded that the sanctions fell far short of what they would have wanted by immediately announcing that they would enact more stringent sanctions on their own, once the resolution passed, giving them the UN imprimatur for harsher measures. The sanctions are intended to insure that Iran’s nuclear program is used only for domestic energy and not to fuel a nuclear weapons program. Iran claims that it needs nuclear power for domestic energy. Ironically, it is the international sanctions caused by Iran’s intransigence regarding inspection of its nuclear program that are crippling development of the country’s conventional oil and gas sources.

Iran’s Gasoline Imports

Iran’s proved oil reserves of 137.6 billion barrels (BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010) accounted for more than 10 percent of the world total, ranking it number three behind Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. But its 2009 oil production of 4.3 million barrels per day represented only 5.3 percent of global output. Sanctions, among other factors, have prevented Iran from expanding its refining capacity, with the result that Iran still has to import more than a third of its gasoline requirements. This makes Iran’s gasoline imports a tempting target. As far back as June 2008, then British Prime Minister Gordon Brown called for oil and gas sanctions on Iran during a visit by then U.S. President Bush. In the meantime, both the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate have passed bills aimed at Iran’s gasoline imports and the text announced today by Sen. Dodd and Rep. Berman will form the basis for discussion by the Conference Committee. A reconciled bill could be passed by both chambers this summer, but whether President Obama would sign the bill into law may hinge on the Congress giving the President more leeway to relax the sanctions on countries or firms that are providing other support to constrain Iran’s nuclear program.

All of the U.S. and European rhetoric has had an effect. Companies who sold gasoline to Iran as recently as last year, but now have halted sales, reportedly include BP, Royal Dutch Shell, India’s Reliance Industries, Swiss firms Vitol and Glencore, Russia’s Lukoil and the Dutch company Trafigura. France’s Total and Malaysia’s Petronas remain Iran’s principal gasoline suppliers.

Several Chinese firms are believed to supply Iran, but this is difficult to trace as shipments often are reportedly routed via Singapore or other third parties or consist of spot purchases routed to Iran. JP Morgan commodities head Lawrence Eagles estimated that last autumn 30,000-40,000 barrels per day (b/d) of Chinese gasoline were moving from the Asian spot market to Iran via third parties. This suggests that even if Europe and the US impose sanctions on selling gasoline to Iran, various “black market” routes will continue to channel supplies, especially if the sanctions succeed in raising the gasoline price in Iran significantly higher than global trading prices.

According to Iran-China Chamber of deputy head Majid-Rez Hariri, China—the world’s second largest consumer and importer of oil after the U.S.—relies on Iran for 11 percent of its energy needs. Iran is China’s third-largest oil supplier, supplying some 460,000 b/d in 2009. China’s Zhuhai Zhenrong Corp., the largest single lifter of Iranian crude, extended its 240,000 b/d contract this year. China cut back purchases of Iranian petroleum products in 2009 due to uncompetitive pricing by Tehran. China National Petroleum Corp., the state-owned onshore giant, signed a $2 billion, 12-year MOU in July 2009 to develop Iran’s North Azadegan oilfied following withdrawl by a Japanese firm. China’s Sinopec, previously the state-owned refiner and marketer, but now a fully integrated state oil company, finalized a $2 billion deal in 2007 to develop Iran’s huge Yadavaran field.

With the U.S. and Europe increasing the pressure on Iran’s gasoline imports, supplies are likely to be constrained and price pressures greater. This might actually help the Iranian government to finally increase gasoline prices and reduce the huge impact of gasoline subsidies on the government budget. The higher gasoline prices also are likely to fuel a much larger black market. Whether these sanctions bring Iran to the bargaining table over its nuclear program remains to be seen.